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C.: The Effect of Medical Treatment as an Intervening Cause in Homici
BDITOBIAL NOTES

tempting to practice and after he becomes a resident, he must
submit to an examination and obtain a license. Residence in,
the state is made prerequisite, but no period thereof is prescribed or indicated.. Requirement of a license before attempting to practice indicates purpose to allow the examination at any time after the change of residence."

THE EFFECT OF MEDICAL TREATMENT AS AN INTERVENING CAUSE
iN HoucCmE.-In a recent case' decided by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, some old and familiar principles of
criminal law are applied to a novel combination of circumstances.
After the subject of the homicide was shot, but while his symptoms
were still normal, an exploratory operation was performed to determine whether the abdominal cavity had been penetrated. It was
found that the abdomen had not been penetrated, but that the appendix was diseased. The operating physician, sua sponte, removed the appendix. The next day, alarming symptoms developed
and death suddenly ensued. The trial court submitted to the jury
the question whether removal of the appendix was the sole, or
only a contributing, cause of death; holding, by way of refusal
of defendant's instructions, that, in order to constitute a defense,
removal of the appendix must have been found to have been the
sole cause of death.
Whether the effect of medical or surgical treatment, as an in-tervening cause, will prevent an original act from being murder
or manslaughter depends upon its relation to the original act.
For purposes of discussion, the relationship between the original
and the intervening act may be analyzed as follows: (1) they may
be contributing causes; (2) the intervening act may be the sole
cause necessarily consequent upon the original act and proximately
connected with it; or (3) the intervening act may be the sole
cause only casually connected with the original act and fortuitously
consequent upon it.
Although the wound be not mortal when inflicted, if it afterward become so and result in death by reason cf negligent or improper treatment, the original act constitutes murder or manslaughter.2 However, it is not essential that the improper treatState v. Snider, 94 S. E. 981 (W. Va. 1918).
v. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537, 26 Am. Rep. 486 (1877);
Crum v. State, 64 Miss., 1, 1 So. 1, 60 Am. Rep. 44 (1886) ; Clark v. Com., 90 Va.
360. 18 S. E. 440 (1893) ; State v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 274 (1857) ; State v. Baker,
21 HALE, P. C. 428; State

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1918

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1918], Art. 5
WEST

VIRGINIA

LAW

QUARTEBLY

ment operate solely by causing mortality in the wound.' It is sufficient if the wound, although at no time mortal by itself,, contribute to the death along with the improper treatment.5 In such
cases, since the criminal liability is based upon the present contributing effect of the original act, it is immaterial whether the
,rignal wound be mortal.0 If death result solely from necessary
and proper medical treatment, liability of the accused may be
predicated upon two different theories which, in the fnal analysis,
are essentially the same: (1) the original wound may be considered the antecedent, as distinguished from a contemporaneous,
.contributing cause; or (2) it may be looked upon merely as a causa
.causans, necessarily imposing the medical treatment. In either
-view, the medical treatment is the natural, necessary and proximate consequence of the wound.7 Hence the original wound may
bear two different relations to the intervening medical treatment
sufficient to resolve the original act into criminal homicide: (1)
the relationship of joint contributory causes and (2) the relationship of one act being proximately consequent upon the other.
Greater difficulty arises where death results solely from un-necessary or improper medical treatment. The authorities seem to
be uniform to the effect that, if the original wound was not mortal
at any time, and death resulted wholly from the improper treatmnent, there can be no conviction of homicide upon the original act.8
I

Jones 267 (N. C. 1854) ; 3 GOEENLEAP, Ev. § 139; 1 MicHnm, HOuCIDDE § 5
6), pp. 14 et scq.
3See citations in note 5, infra.
'Quinn v. State, 64 So. (Miss. 1914) 738.
aState v. Morphy, 33 Iowa 270, 11 Am. Rep. 122 (1871) ; Kee v. State, 28 Ark.
155 (1873) ; Corn. v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136 (Mass. 1861) ; People v. (LewIs, 124 Cal.
551, 57 Pac. 470, 45 L. R. A. 783 (1899) ; People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236, ,33 Am
Rep. 380 (1878) ; People -v. Kane, 213 N. Y. 260, 107 N. E. 655 (1915) ; 1 MimCar,
HOmCIDE § 5 (6), pp. 14 et seq.
GDowning v. State, 114 Ga. 30, 39 S. E. 927 (1901) ; 'Hamblin v. State, 115
N. W. 850 (Neb. 1908).
The necessity
Com. v. McPlke, 3 Cush. 181, 50 Am. Dec. 727 (Mass. 1849).
:and propriety of the treatment is determined by the apparent condition of the
wound. Ibid. Also, see Clark V. Com., 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 440 (1893) ; Coffman V.
Com., 10 Bush. 495 (Ky. 1874); Com. v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 476, 37 Atil. 521,
59 Am. St. Rep. 670 (1897) ; Odeneal v. State, 157 S. W. 419 (Tenn. 1913). The
Idea of causal connection has been judicially expressed by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals as follows: "The rule violated is the same where the negligence
of a responsible agent intervenes to cause the death, as in the case of isurgeons, but
not if death results from proper surgical or medical aid, for death resulting from
:that cause is one of the consequences of the previous unlawful act, and does not
excuse the one responsible therefor." State v. Angelina, 73 W. Va. "146, 80 S. H.
141, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 877 (1913).
8
State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa 270, 11 Am. Rep. 122 (1871) ; Com. v. Hackett, 2
Allen 136 (Mass. 1861) ; People v. Cook, 39 MIch. 236, 33 Am. Rep. 380 (1878)
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And, on principle, it would seem that, although the original wound
were mortal, if improper medical treatment intervened as a sole,
not a contributing, cause of death, it would preclude homicide
based on the original act; granting that in most cases it would be
difficult to prove that such a wound did not actually contribute in
some degree to the death. 9 In such a case, obviously, the wound
has no contemporaneous contributory effect. Although improper
medical treatment is a foreseeable result of -the wound, it would be
rather a harsh stigma upon the medical profession to say that it is
the usual or proximate consequence of the wound. Hence, it
may be said that, while the improper treatment resulted from the
original act of the accused, still it is only a casual, not a proximate,
result; that the original act gave an opportunity for the improper
treatment, but that the improper treatment was not a .necessary or
proximate consequence thereof; that only proper treatment would
be the proximate result of the injury. While no cases have been
found broadly asserting such a theory, still a strong tinge of the
doctrine may be observed permeating many of the authorities. 10
2 BisHop, NEW Ca. LAW § 639; 1 MIcr-mE, HOmram. § 5 (7) p. 16. In State v.
Gabriella, 144 N. W. 9 (Iowa 1913), It is said that an improper operation will not
excuse, but the facts of the case show that the wound was a contributing cause,
and hence the operation was not the sole cause.
'Coffman v. Com., 10 Bush. 495 (Ky. 1874). "If the wound be not mortal, but
with ill application by the party, or those about him, of unwholesome salves or
medicines, the party dies, if it clearly appears that the medicines, and not the
wound, was the cause of the death, it seems It is not homicide, but then it must
clearly and certainly appear to be so." HALE, P. C. 428. This passage from Hale
is quoted in many of the cases. It seems to have established the impression that,
if the wound is mortal, the improper treatment will not prevent the infliction of the
wound from being homicide. The positive language of Hale expresses only the effect
of a wound not mortal. He likely had in mind precedents applying only to such
wounds. If he had intended to apply a converse rule to mortal wounds, and had
authority to support such a proposition, it does not seem likely that he would have
left the assertion to mere implication. To undertake to sustain such a rule on the
familiar principle of constructive intent-that one will be taken to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act-and so avoid the effect of the intervening act as a sole cause, would be to beg the question. In other words, the homicide must be established before such Intent will be Implied. In fact, the full intent
3aay be conceded, but it has not 'been executed. The cases are uniform in holding
that an independent intervening act of another as a sole cause will prevent the
original act, although the wound be mortal from constituting homicide. There would
seem to be nothing to differentiate Improper medical treatment from any other
s 3244 and 1
intervening cause. See CLAnK and MARSHALL, THE LAW or CR
McHIE, HOMICDE § 5 (7), p. 16, whete no distinction, in stating the rule, is made
between wounds mortal and wounds not mortal. It has been said that, if the wound
is not mortal, there must be an intervening cause. 2 BisHop, NEW Ca. LAW § 639.
But it does not follow that, if the wound is mortal, there cannot be an intervening
cause.
101 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, 11 ed., 245 et seq. In general, .ee the cases cited,
supra. It would seem that the measure of the physician's or surgeon's negligence
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However, the effect of the improper treatment may be interpreted
in the light of another mode of reasoning.
It is axiomatic that two homicides cannot be committed upon the
same person. If a physician or surgeon causes the death of a
person through negligent or improper treatment, he himself is
guilty of manslaughter. Therefore the accused could not be guilty
of an independent murder or manslaughter upon the same person.
To hold the physician or surgeon guilty of manslaughter, and, at
the same time, to hold the accused guilty of murder or manslaughter, upon the ground of foreseeability of improper treatment or
any other ground, would be to have a homicide within a homicide,
which cannot be. On the other hand, they could not be held jointly
guilty of one homicide because there is no community of intent or
act. The improper treatment is the sole cause emerging from an
independent volition." And such a mode of reasoning may be
taken as fortifying the proposition that the improper treatment is
not the proximate consequence of the original wound.
In the principal case, the incision and examination of the abdomen may have been proper treatment under the circumstances.
If so, they were the proximate result of the original wound. If
death resulted from the incision and examination, or either of them,
or from any detail of treatment necessarily consequent thereupon,
the defendant was guilty of criminal homicide. If the incision was
wholly and obviously unnecessary and death resulted exclusively
therefrom, the defendant was not guilty of homicide, although he
may be guilty of an assault with intent to kill. In such event, his
act is neither a proximate nor a contributing cause to the death.
Whether the incision and examination were proper treatment or
not, if the original wound was a contributing cause of death, the
defendant is guilty. So far, the principal case presents only features! often illustrated in the criminal law. But the removal of
the appendix involves an unusual complication. Clearly, such an
act, however meritorious on the part of the surgeon, was in no
A test which has been laid down
would be a criterion as to guilt of the accused.
State v. Scott,
is that of an ordinarily prudent and skilled surgeon or physician.

A more stringent rule Is stated In a recent decision:
12 La. Ann. 274 (1857).
"The rule on this subject, supported by the weight of authority, is that, to exonerate the accused from the charge of causing death by a dangerous wound unlawfully
inflicted, it must appear, not only that the operation was performed in a grossly
negligent and unskillful manner, but also that it was the sole cause of death,
* * * ". Odeneal v. State, 157 S. W. 419 (Tenn .1913). The former rule is in
accord with the rule in torts.
"I WHARTON,

CRItLEMAL LAw, 11 ed., 245 ct seq.
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sense treatment of the original wound. In relation to the act of
the defendant, it is an independent intervening act-as much so
as if the deceased had been maliciously wounded by another person than the accused-and is only casually consequent upon either
the original wound or the incision. Hence, as the court instructed
the jury, if the removal of the appendix was the sole cause of
death, the defendant is not guilty. However, where the independent act of another party intervenes, it shifts liability from the
original assailant only where it is the sole cause of death. Although
removal of the appendix may have been a contributing cause of
death, still, if the wound inflicted by the defendant contributed
to the death, he is guilty. And it necessarily follows from what
has been said that, if either the original wound, or the incision and
its proximate consequences (provided the incision was proper treatment of the wound), contributed with the removal of the appendix
to produce death, the defendant is guilty of homicide. In othey
words, the original wound may be a contributing cause, either di.
rectly or through its proximate consequences as manifested in the
intervening act. Hence, the Court properly refused the defendant's instructions.
-L. C.

RIGHTS OF TENANT IN COMMON WHERE OIL IS EXTRACTED UNDER

UNAUTHORIZED LEASE FROM Co-TENANT.-In Paxton v. BenedumTrees Oil Co.," it is apparently held, where one tenant in common
of the oil and gas in place under certain land makes an oil and
gas lease without the consent of his co-tenant, and the lessee enters
and produces oil under the lease, that, on an accounting against
the lessor and lessee the co-tenant can recover as damages only
one-eighth of his share of the oil taken from the land. In this case
the wronged co-tenant, Kemper by name, apparently was not a
party to the suit though the decision purports to adjudicate his
rights. It would seem that since the lessee and lessor are liable
for waste under the statute, if there was not a wilful violation of
Kemper's rights, then he ought to have the right to elect to take
either the value of the oil at the surface of the ground less the
reasonable cost of production2 or his proportionate share of the
194 S. E. 472

(W. Va. 1917).

sWilliamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897); McNeely V. South
Penn Oil Co., 58 W. Va. 438, 52 S. E. 480 (1905).
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